A number of papers have shown that a strict Nash equilibrium action pro¯le of a game may never be played if there is a small amount of incomplete information (see, for example, Carlsson and van Damme (1993a) ). We present a general approach to analyzing the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information. A Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is said to be robust to incomplete information if every incomplete information game with payo®s almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to the Nash equilibrium. We show that an open set of games has no robust equilibrium and examine why we get such di®erent results from the re¯nements literature. We show that if a game has a unique correlated equilibrium, it is robust. Finally, a natural many-player many-action generalization of risk dominance is shown to be a su±cient condition for robustness.
Introduction
Before Harsanyi's seminal contribution (Harsanyi (1967) ), game theory was subject to the apparently compelling criticism that all conclusions relied completely on the assumption that payo®s were common knowledge. Harsanyi's formulation of games of incomplete information allowed analysis of situations where payo®s are not common knowledge. In this paper, we return to the classic question of how sensitive the conclusions of (complete information) game theory are to the common knowledge of payo®s assumption.
Suppose we¯x a Nash equilibrium of a complete information game. Say that it is robust to incomplete information if behavior close to it is an equilibrium of every nearby incomplete information game. By \nearby" incomplete information game, we mean that the sets of players and actions are the same as in the complete information game and, with high probability, each player knows that his payo®s are the same. By \behavior close to it", we mean that the distribution over actions generated by the Nash equilibrium is close to the distribution over actions generated by an equilibrium of the nearby incomplete information game.
Although this de¯nition has the°avor of the \re¯nements" literature, we show that it has very di®erent properties. In particular, we show that there exists an open set of games which have a unique (strict) Nash equilibrium that is not robust. The argument is based on an \infection argument" similar to that of Rubinstein (1989) :¯x a complete information game and suppose that payo®s of an incomplete information game are always the same as the complete information game, except that at some information set of small probability, one player has a dominant strategy to play an action which is not part of the unique Nash pro¯le. If there is an information set where a second player attaches high probability to the¯rst player's information set, we can guarantee that the second player has a unique best response (not in the unique Nash pro¯le) at that information set. We can iterate this argument to ensure that the unique Nash pro¯le of actions is never played in any equilibrium of the incomplete information game. Since this can be done no matter how small the probability of the information set of the¯rst player, the Nash equilibrium is shown not to be robust. We will discuss below why we get such di®erent results from the re¯nements literature.
We present positive results which show two di®erent kinds of su±cient conditions for robustness. The¯rst comes from the observation that if an incomplete information game is near a complete information game, then any equilibrium of the incomplete information game generates a distribution over actions which is an approximate correlated equilibrium of the complete information game (the payo® uncertainty allows correlation of actions). Thus if a complete information game has a unique correlated equilibrium, then that equilibrium -which must be also a Nash equilibrium -is robust (by the upper hemicontinuity of the correlated equilibrium correspondence). This is the¯rst su±cient condition for robustness.
Our second, more interesting, su±cient condition works by showing a necessary connection between the ex ante probability of an event and the probability that players have certain higher order beliefs about that event. In order to develop this result, we¯rst review some earlier work.
Following Morris, Rob and Shin (1995) , say that an action pro¯le a´(a 1 ; :::; a I ) in an I player game is a (p 1 ; :::; p I )-dominant equilibrium if each action a i is a best response to any conjecture putting probability at least p i on other players choosing a ¡i . Write p´(p 1 ; :::; p I ) for such a pro¯le of probabilities. Following Monderer and Samet (1989) , say that an event is p-evident if each individual i attaches probability at least p i to the event whenever it is true. These de¯nitions can be related together to prove a result about the equilibria of incomplete information games. Suppose that a complete information game has a p-dominant equilibrium a; suppose also that an incomplete information game contains an event E which [1] is p-evident; and [2] has the property that payo®s are given by the complete information game at all states in E. Then the incomplete information game has an equilibrium where a is played at all states in E.
This result suggests a strategy for proving robustness. Suppose a complete information game has a p-dominant equilibrium a. If we could show that every nearby incomplete information game contains a high probability event E which satis¯es the two properties cited above, we would be done. In fact, Monderer and Samet (1989) have provided an algorithm which -for any given information structure -¯nds the largest probability event E satisfying those two properties. Say that an event is p-believed if each individual i believes it with probability at least p i . Say that an event is common p-belief if it is p-believed, it is p-believed that it is p-believed, etc... Then the largest event E satisfying the two properties above will be the set of states where it is common p-belief that payo®s are given by the complete information game.
But what is the connection between the probability of an event and the probability of the set of states where that event is common p-belief? We show that if I P i=1 p i < 1, then as the probability of an event tends to 1, the probability that the event is common p-belief tends to 1 uniformly across information systems. Conversely, if
p i¸1 , then it is possible to construct an information structure which has an event with probability arbitrarily close to 1, which is never common p-belief. This result shows a surprising necessary connection between the ex ante probability of an event and the ex ante probability of individuals having certain higher order beliefs. As an immediate corollary, we have that if an action pro¯le a is a p-dominant equilibrium
These su±cient conditions are rather strong. However, they can be used to give a complete characterization of robustness in one special but much studied class of games. In generic two player, two action games, there is always exactly one robust equilibrium: if the game has a unique pure strategy equilibrium, it is robust; if the game has two pure strategy equilibria, then the risk dominant equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten (1988) ) is robust; if the game has no pure strategy equilibrium, then the unique mixed strategy equilibrium is robust.
What should we conclude about the robustness of game theoretic predictions to the common knowledge of payo®s assumption? We have shown that, in some contexts, an arbitrarily small probability that the analyst has mis-speci¯ed the payo®s of a game might imply very di®erent behavior and outcomes from the game without the misspeci¯cation. In this sense, game theoretic predictions are not robust to the common knowledge of payo®s assumption. On the other hand, there are circumstances when there is a robust prediction.
These are the main results of the paper. We will now relate them back to the extensive related literature. First, there is the \re¯nements" literature. In that literature, perturbations have typically been either directly on players' action choices (the \trembles" approach) or on the payo®s of a complete information game. We, on the other hand, perturb payo®s indirectly, via the information structure. However, these qualitative di®erences do not account for why we get such di®erent results -in particular, the result that even unique strict Nash equilibria need not be robust. The di®erences arise because of the richness of the perturbed games which we consider. Thus we show (in section 7) that if we restricted attention to nearby incomplete information games with either bounded state spaces or independent signals about payo®s, then all strict equilibria would be robust.
Our work follows Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine (1988) and Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) in studying the robustness of game theoretic predictions (they considered, respectively, strict equilibrium and iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) when there is a small amount of incomplete information. Our technique of \embedding" a complete information game in \near-by" incomplete information game closely follows theirs. But they tested whether an outcome can be justi¯ed by some sequence of perturbed games, while we require robustness to all such sequences. Thus our work relates to their work as stability type re¯nements relate to perfection type re¯nements.
1
Our work builds most strongly on a literature relating higher order beliefs to the equilibria of incomplete information games, especially Monderer and Samet (1989) and Morris, Rob and Shin (1995) . While we use extensively techniques and results from those papers, we go one step further. Instead of making assumptions about players' higher order beliefs about payo®s, we make assumptions about the ex ante probabilities of payo®s and deduce the required properties of players' higher order beliefs, which can then be used to characterize equilibria.
The robustness question which we study complements the main question previously studied 1 Another di®erence is that¯nite state space and independence assumptions in those papers ensure that allowing only a small amount of ex ante uncertainty about payo®s implies that, with high probability, payo®s are common p-belief in the sense of Monderer and Samet (1989) , for some p close to 1 (thus BÄ orgers (1994) establishes essentially the same conclusion as Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) by directly assuming that payo®s are common p-belief, for p close to 1). We will allow in¯nite state spaces and correlated signals where such equivalences do not work.
in the higher order beliefs literature. Given that some Nash equilibria are not robust to the inclusion of a small amount of incomplete information, there are two natural questions to ask. First, which Nash equilibria of a complete information game can always be played in equilibria of nearby incomplete information games. This is the question addressed in this paper. Second, how must the notion of a \nearby" incomplete information games be strengthened in order to ensure that, for every Nash equilibrium of a complete information game, similar behavior is generated by an equilibrium of every nearby incomplete information game. This lower hemicontinuity question has been studied in the literature. 2 Say that an incomplete information game is nearby a complete information game if, with high probability, it is common p-belief -with p close to 1 -that payo®s are those of the complete information game. This notion is su±cient to ensure that all Nash equilibria are robust in the sense described above. This result is implied by Monderer and Samet (1989) . Monderer and Samet (1990) and Kajii and Morris (1994b) can be interpreted as showing (in di®erent settings) that this notion of closeness is necessary and su±cient for the lower hemicontinuity.
Finally, Carlsson and van Damme (1993a) have considered a closely related robustness question. They suppose that each player of a two player, two action game observes a noisy signal of the payo®s. They show that as the noise goes to zero, the unique (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium has the risk dominant (Nash) equilibrium of the complete information game being played. Similar techniques also work in some many player settings -see Carlsson and van Damme (1993b) and Kim (1993) . There are many reasons why our results are not directly comparable; but our work should be seen as replicating some of their results in a di®erent setting, as well as providing new results. The key di®erence is that while Carlsson and van Damme consider a certain critical class of payo® perturbations with continuous signals, we characterize robustness to all perturbations with countable state spaces. The relation is discussed in more detail in the appendix (section 9.4).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our approach to embedding complete information games in nearby incomplete information games and de¯ne the notion of robustness. In section 3, we show that a unique correlated equilibrium must be robust but that a (strict) Nash equilibrium need not be. In section 4, we review results on belief operators and common p-belief and present new results on ex ante probabilities and higher order beliefs. In section 5, these results are applied to give further positive robustness results. In section 6, we provide a complete characterization of robustness for two player, two action games. In section 7, we discuss alternative notions of robustness and the relation to re¯nements. Section 8 concludes.
Framework

Complete Information Games
Throughout this analysis, we¯x a complete information game G consisting of a¯nite collection of players I = f1; ::; Ig and, for each player i, a¯nite action set A i and payo® function g i : A ! <, where A = A 1 £ :: £ A I . Thus G = © I; fA i g i2I ; fg i g i2I ª . We shall denote
A j by A ¡i and a generic element of A ¡i by a ¡i . Similar conventions will be used whenever it is clear from the context. For any¯nite set S, denote by ¢ (S) the set of all probability measures on S.
An action distribution ¹ is a Nash equilibrium if it is a correlated equilibrium and, for all a 2 A,
where
This indirect way of de¯ning (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the standard one.
Embedding Complete Information Games in Incomplete Information Games
We will require a way of comparing complete and incomplete information games. An incomplete information game is said to \embed" the complete information game G =
it has the same sets of players and actions. For our purposes, an incomplete information game U consists of (1) the collection of players, I = f1; ::; Ig; (2) their action sets, A 1 ; :::; A I ; (3) a countable state space, -; (4) a probability measure on the state space, P; (5), for each player i, a partition of the state space, Q i ; and (6), for each player i, a state dependent payo® function, u i : A £ -! <. Thus U = © I; fA i g i2I ; -; P; fQ i g i2I ; fu i g i2I ª . We write P (!) for the probability of the singleton event f!g and Q i (!) for the (unique) element of Q i containing !. Throughout the paper we will restrict attention to incomplete information games where every information set of every player is possible, that is P [Q i (!)] > 0 for all i 2 I and ! 2 -. Under this assumption the conditional probability of state ! given information set Q i (!), written P [!jQ i (!)], is well-de¯ned by the
. If U satis¯es all the above properties, we say that U embeds G; we write E (G) for the set of incomplete information games which embed G:
A (mixed) strategy for player i is a Q i -measurable function ¾ i : -! ¢(A i ). We denote by ¾ i (a i j!) the probability that action a i is chosen given ! under ¾ i . A strategy pro¯le is a function ¾ = (¾ i ) i2I where ¾ i is a strategy for player i. We write § for the collection of such strategy pro¯les. We denote by ¾ (aj!) the probability that action pro¯le a is chosen given ! under ¾; we write ¾ ¡i for (¾ j ) j6 =i ; when no confusion arises, we extend the domain of each u i to mixed strategies and thus write u i (¾ (!) ; !) for P a2A u i (a; !) ¾ (aj!). Now the payo® of strategy pro¯le ¾ to player i is given by the expected utility
which can also be written as
De¯nition 2.2. A strategy pro¯le ¾ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of U if, for all a i 2 A i and ! 2 -,
A strategy pro¯le ¾ speci¯es the probability of a given action pro¯le being played at a given state. We will be interested in a reduced form representation of the strategy pro¯le, where we only report the ex ante probability of certain actions being played. De¯nition 2.3. An action distribution, ¹ 2 ¢ (A), is an equilibrium action distribution of U if there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium ¾ of U such that ¹ (a) = P !2-¾ (aj!) P (!).
Robustness
We want to formalize the idea that an incomplete information game U is close to a complete information game G if the payo® structure under U is equal to that under G with high probability. Thus, for each incomplete information game U 2 E (G), write -U for the set of states where payo®s are given by G, and every player knows his payo®s:
To clarify the idea of "-elaborations, consider 0-elaborations. The degenerate 0-elaboration is the game where -is a singleton set, and the original complete information game is played with probability 1. The set of equilibrium action distributions of the degenerate incomplete information game is just the set of Nash equilibria of the complete information game. But 0-elaborations can entail more complicated information structures that allow players to correlate their actions. Indeed, an action distribution is an equilibrium action distribution of some 0-elaboration of G if and only if it is correlated equilibrium of G (see Aumann (1987) ). Thus while two 0-elaborations may appear close to an outside observer, it should be clear that they are not close in any game theoretic sense.
We will measure the distance between action distributions by the max norm:
De¯nition 2.5. An action distribution ¹ is robust to incomplete information in G if, for every ± > 0, there exists ¹ " > 0 such that, for all " · ¹ ", every U 2 E (G; ") has an equilibrium action distribution º with k¹ ¡ ºk · ±.
In words, an action distribution ¹ is robust if every slightly perturbed game has an equilibrium action distribution that is close to ¹. Notice that if ¹ is robust to incomplete information, it is a Nash equilibrium since the degenerate 0-elaboration belongs to E (G; 0).
Remark 1.
It is important that we allow payo®s under an "-elaboration U to be very di®erent from G outside the set -U . Quite di®erent results would follow if, in addition, we required the payo®s outside -U to be uniformly within " of G.
Remark 2. For simplicity, our de¯nition focuses on elaborations where, with high probability, each player knows that his payo®s are given by G. Essentially the same results would follow if we replaced \knows" by \believes with high probability," as long as we imposed a bound on payo®s in the elaboration (see section 9.4.2 in the appendix). Players' uncertainty about their own payo® function is orthogonal to the issues considered in this paper.
Remark 3. An alternative formulation would require every U 2 E (G; ") to have an equilibrium ¾ with ex ante payo®s within ± of payo®s under ¹. If, in addition, we bounded payo®s outside -U , this would give the same results.
Remark 4. The de¯nition requires a property uniformly over "-elaborations, as we vary all characteristics of the incomplete information games. It will be clear from the arguments which follow that we could allow ¹ " to depend on the state space and information partitions as long as we still required uniformity with respect to probability distributions on that state space. There is further discussion of this issue in the appendix (section 9.3).
Remark 5. In the related work of Monderer and Samet (1989) , allowing for interim "-equilibrium in the incomplete information game makes a large di®erence to the result. We will note when we give our non-existence example that this would not make a di®erence to our exercise.
Remark 6. We allow players to correlate their actions via information in the elaborations. Yet we require (in our de¯nition of robustness) that an action distribution be (nearly) played in an equilibrium of every nearby elaboration, including degenerate ones where no correlation is possible. A more reasonable de¯nition might allow players access to payo®-irrelevant randomizing devices with private signals, uncorrelated with the states of the elaborations (see Cotter (1991) ). Thus say that ¹ 2 ¢ (A) is a correlated equilibrium action distribution of U if there exists a correlated equilibrium » 2 ¢ ( §) of U with
and say that ¹ 2 ¢ (A) is robust with correlation to incomplete information if it satis¯es de¯nition 2.5 with \equilibrium action distribution" replaced by \correlated equilibrium action distribution". By de¯nition, any robust ¹ is also robust with correlation; thus our positive results would continue to hold with this de¯nition. We will verify that our negative result also holds with this de¯nition.
The Robustness of Unique Nash Equilibria
In this section, we consider complete information games which have a unique Nash equilibrium and examine when it is robust. Intuitively, this should be the easiest setting in which demonstrate robustness. However, we¯rst provide an open class of games with a unique (strict) Nash equilibrium which is not robust. The game has the following interpretation. Each player's payo® depends only on his own action and the action of his \adversary". Adversaries are determined by the cycle 1 ! 3 ! 2 ! 1::, so that 3 is 1's adversary etc.. Thus, for example, 1's payo® is completely independent of 2's action. Each player has a safe action under which he gets 1 4 (independent of his adversary's action). If he does not play his safe action, then he is playing a cyclic matching pennies game, where he tries to choose the face of the coin di®erent from his adversary's. Thus player 2 gets 1 if he doesn't match 1's choice, ¡1 otherwise. Player 3 gets 1 if he doesn't match 2's choice, ¡1 otherwise. Player 1 gets 1 if he doesn't match 3's choice, ¡1 otherwise. Each player gets 0 if his adversary chooses a safe action and he does not.
Note for future reference that if any player puts probability strictly greater than 5 8 on his adversary choosing H or T, he has a strict best response to do the opposite (and not play S). Thus if 1 thinks that player 3 will play H with probability q > . This game has a unique Nash equilibrium where all players choose S. To see why,¯rst suppose that 1 plays H in equilibrium with positive probability, but not T. Then 2 never plays H. So 3 never plays T . So 1 never plays H, a contradiction. Suppose now that 1 plays both H and T in equilibrium. Then 3 must play H and T with equal probability. So the payo® to 1 of playing H and T is 0 which is strictly less than 1 4 , the payo® to playing S. So we have another contradiction. Now consider the following "-elaboration of G. Let -be the set of non-negative integers;
Partitions are given by Q 1 = (f0; 1; 2g ; f3; 4; 5g ; :::); Q 2 = (f0g ; f1; 2; 3g ; f4; 5; 6g; :::) and Q 3 = (f0; 1g ; f2; 3; 4g ; f5; 6; 7g ; :::). Let u i (a; !) = g i (a) unless either i = 3 and ! 2 f0; 1g or i = 2 and ! = 0. Let u 3 ((a 1 ; a 2 ; H ) ; !) = 1, u 3 ((a 1 ; a 2 ; T ) ; !) = 0 and u 3 ((a 1 ; a 2 ; S) ; !) = 0 for all a 1 , a 2 and ! 2 f0; 1g; and let u 2 ((a 1 ; T; a 3 ) ; 0) = 0, u 2 ((a 1 ; H; a 3 ) ; 0) = 0 and u 3 ((a 1 ; S; a 3 ) ; 0) = 0 for all a 1 , a 3 . Thus player 3 has a dominant strategy to play H at information set f0; 1g, player 2 has a dominant strategy to play T at information set f0g, and payo®s are given by G everywhere else. Note that -U = f2; 3; 4; :::g, so
Now at information set f0; 1; 2g, 1 assigns probability at least 2 3 to 3 playing H, so 1 must play T . But by a similar argument, 2 must then play H at f1; 2; 3g, 3 must play T at f2; 3; 4g, 1 must play H at f3; 4; 5g and so on. Safe is played nowhere. Thus for any " > 0, we can construct an "-elaboration where the unique Nash equilibrium is never played in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The following table describes the actions in that unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This negative example does, however, suggest a strategy for identifying robust equilibria in other games. The unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium ¾ " and the unique equilibrium action distribution ¹ " it implies are summarized in the following:
f0; 6; 12; :::g
(T; H; H) f1; 7; 13; :::g
(T; H; T ) f2; 8; 14; :::g
(H; H; T) f3; 9; 15; :::g
(H; T; T ) f4; 10; 16; :::g
(H; T; H) f5; 11; 17; :::g
As " ! 0 (and thus P [-U ] ! 1), the equilibrium action distribution converges to a correlated equilibrium of G with each of fH; H; Tg, fH; T; Hg, fH; T; Tg, fT; H; Hg, fT; H; Tg, fT; T; Hg played with probability 1 6 (thus the bad outcomes fH; H; Hg and fT; T; T g are avoided). Each player's expected payo® is 1 3 in this correlated equilibrium. We will see that convergence to a correlated equilibrium is going to be a general property, which we will be able to exploit in providing our¯rst positive robustness result in the next section. But¯rst we will verify that the selection of this equilibrium is robust to a number of features of the construction. ² In the above argument, each optimal action gives a payo® of at least 1 3 , and thus gives a payo® at least 1 12 higher than the next best action. Thus the table describes not only the unique equilibrium but also the unique interim 1 12 -equilibrium. Thus allowing interim "-equilibria in our de¯nition of robustness would not help in this example.
² The above argument also shows that the strategies identi¯ed are the unique (incomplete information game) strategies which survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. This ensures that the unique correlated equilibrium of the incomplete information game entails each player choosing those strategies with probability one. Thus if any action distribution is going to be robust with correlation (see de¯nition in remark 6 on page 9), it must be the correlated equilibrium identi¯ed above. But notice that we could easily alter the above sequence of "-elaborations to ensure a di®erent limit. Suppose that (for each ") we increased the probability of states 0, 6, 12, etc... by a small amount while decreasing the probability of all other states. If the change was not too large, the same strategy pro¯le would remain the unique one surviving iterated deletion. But the limit equilibrium action distribution would put strictly higher probability on action pro¯le (T; T; H) and strictly lower probability on the others. Thus the cyclic matching pennies game also has no correlated equilibrium which is robust with correlation to incomplete information.
² If we perturbed payo®s slightly, the argument (relying as it does on iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies) would go through unchanged. Thus the set of complete information games where there is no robust equilibrium is open in the set of payo® matrices.
A Su±cient Condition for Robustness
The previous discussion suggests that the limit of equilibrium action distributions of a sequence of "-elaborations of a complete information game must be a correlated equilibrium. This gives the following:
A related result appears in Shin and Williamson (1994) . The condition that there is a unique correlated equilibrium is very strong but far from vacuous. If a two player, two action game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, then the unique mixed strategy equilibrium is the unique correlated equilibrium (see section 6). Dominance solvable games (where a unique action pro¯le survives iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies) have unique correlated equilibria; so do two player zero sum games with a unique Nash equilibrium (Aumann (1987) and Forges (1990) ). Neyman (1991) and Cripps (1994) give su±cient conditions for all correlated equilibria to be convex combinations of Nash equilibria, and thus for uniqueness of Nash equilibrium to imply uniqueness of correlated equilibrium.
The proof of proposition 3.2 requires some preliminary de¯nitions and lemmas.
Note that 0-correlated equilibrium is equivalent to the de¯nition of correlated equilibrium (de¯nition 2.1) given on page 6. Lemma 3.4. For any complete information game G and´> 0, there exists ¹ " > 0 such that every equilibrium action distribution of every "-elaboration of G with " · ¹ " is an´-correlated equilibrium.
Proof. Let U be an "-elaboration of G and let ¾ be any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of U.
. By the assumption that ¾ is an equilibrium, we have, for all ! 2 -,
Thus by equation (3.1) and the de¯nition of -iU , we have, for all ! 2 -iU ,
and so
and so for any´, it is enough to set ¹ " =Ḿ . 2 Since ¢ (A) is compact, an immediate implication of lemma 3.4 is:
Now the proof of proposition 3.2 is completed as follows. Suppose a unique correlated equilibrium ¹ ¤ is not robust. Then there exists ± > 0 and a sequence of " k -elaborations U k where " k ! 0 such that for every equilibrium ¾ k of U k with induced action distribution ¹ k ,¯¯¯¯¹ k ¡ ¹ ¤¯¯> ±. By corollary 3.5, ¹ k must have a convergent subsequence whose limit is a correlated equilibrium, which must be di®erent from ¹ ¤ since¯¯¯¯¹ k ¡ ¹ ¤¯¯> ±; this contradicts uniqueness. 2 We emphasize that proposition 3.2 is on the behavior of the equilibrium action distribution, i.e., the average behavior across states. The following example shows that even under the very strong assumption of a unique correlated equilibrium, there is no guarantee that equilibrium behavior in the "-elaboration is close to the unique equilibrium behavior of G at any given state, or even with high probability. Example 3.6. Simple Matching Pennies. Let I = f1; 2g; A 1 = A 2 = fH; T g; payo®s are given by
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium ¹ ¤ where each player randomizes
It is straightforward to verify that there is no other correlated equilibrium of this game (as also shown by lemma 9.4 on page 42). Thus by proposition 3.2, ¹ ¤ is robust. Some intuition for both corollary 3.5 and proposition 3.2 comes from considering the following "-elaboration U " . Let -= Z + (the set of non-negative integers); P (!) = " (1 ¡ ") ! ; Q 1 = (f0; 1g ; f2; 3g ; :::) and Q 2 = (f0g ; f1; 2g; :::). Suppose u i (a; !) = g i (a) for all i 2 I and a 2 A, except that 2 has a dominant strategy to play H at information set f0g. The incomplete information game U " has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium where player 1 plays H (with probability 1) at information sets f0; 1g, f4; 5g, etc...; while he plays T at information sets f2; 3g, f6; 7g, etc...; similarly, player 2 plays H at information sets f0g, f3; 4g, etc...; and he plays T at information sets f1; 2g, f5; 6g, etc... Thus the unique equilibrium action distribution,
as " ! 0, for all a 2 A. This is also an implication of corollary 3.5. But notice that for every " and at every state, the unique equilibrium behavior is a pure strategy and thus very di®erent from the unique Nash equilibrium strategy.
p-Belief
As noted in the introduction, our second positive robustness result uses new results about the ex ante probability of higher order belief events. Thus, in this section, we introduce belief operators and common p-belief (in section 4.1) and report the critical path result which shows that for su±cient small p, there is a connection between ex ante probability and statements about higher order beliefs (in sections 4.2 and 4.3). In section 5, we will use this result in generating a positive robustness result.
Common p-Belief
Fix the information system part of an incomplete information game, i.e. © I; -; P; fQ i g i2I ª . We maintain the assumption that P [Q i (!)] > 0, for all i 2 I and ! 2 -. For any number p i 2 (0; 1], de¯ne B
is the set of states where player i believes E with probability at least p i . For any row vector p = (p 1 ; ::
is the set of states where E is p-believed, i.e. each player i believes E with probability at least p i . An event is said to be common p-belief if it is p-believed, it is p-believed that it is p-believed, etc...; thus E is common p-belief
Monderer and Samet (1989) introduced such belief operators and characterized common p-belief for symmetric p, i.e. C (p;::;p) (E). Their results remain true essentially as stated in the case of asymmetric p. This section reports the trivial extension.
Write F i for the ¾-¯eld generated by Q i and say that event E is simple if
We will use the following straightforward properties of belief operators which we state without proof.
Fact 3. For all events E, B
The following result follows Monderer and Samet (1989) .
Proof. By properties 4 and 5,
Thus by fact 6,
¤ (E), the \only if" part of the proposition is satis¯ed setting F = C p (E).
Conversely, suppose F is p-evident, ! 2 F and F µ B p ¤ (E). By fact 2, we have for all n¸0,
By F p-evident and fact 2, we have for all n¸1, F µ
The Critical Path Result
What is the connection between the (ex ante) probability of an event E and the ex ante probability of the event C p (E)? The following proposition shows that if 
This result is tight in the following two senses 3 : 
p i¸1 and q < 1, then there exists an information system © I; -; P; fQ i g i2I ª and a simple event E, with P [E] = q and C p (E) = ;. Proposition 4.3 is of some interest beyond its use in this paper, so before giving a proof, let us make a few observations about the proposition. First, as Monderer and Samet (1989) observed, the characterization of common p-belief described in the previous sub-section was independent of the common prior assumption. That is, if we endowed each individual with a di®erent prior measure P i , and de¯ned belief operators by B 4 .2 and its proof would remain unchanged. Indeed, the game theoretic results which Monderer and Samet prove using common p-belief would also be unchanged. By contrast, proposition 4.3 relies on the common prior assumption. Suppose I = f1; 2g; -= f1; 2; :::; 2Ng;
Q 1 = (f1; 2g; f3; 4g ; :::; f2N ¡ 1; 2N g) and Q 2 = (f1g f2; 3g ; :::; f2N g). Consider the event E = f3; 4; ::::; 2Ng;
N , so we can make both ex ante probabilities of event E arbitrarily close to 1 by choosing N su±ciently large. But C p (E) = ;, for all p with p 1 > " and p 2 > ".
Second, note that while proposition 4.3 concerns the ex ante probability of events, it can be used to prove results about the existence of certain events as follows; write #Q i for the (perhaps in¯nite) number of elements of i's information partition. If
A and each element of Q j has positive probability, some el-
Morris (1993) showed the same conclusion with an independent argument under the assumptions that all Q i¯n ite are¯nite, I = 2 and p 1 = p 2 = 1 2 . This case was critical in the results of Morris, Rob and Shin (1995) .
Finally, let us note that if we did not restrict attention to simple events, a version of proposition 4.3 would still hold with a weaker bound.
Corollary 4.5. In any information system © I; -; P;
, the corollary is a straightforward consequence of proposition 4.3 and lemma 4.7 (which will be proved in the next section).
Proof of the Critical Path Result
We prove the critical path result in this sub-section. Because the argument is somewhat intricate and -we believe -of more general interest, we present a proof which -while long -clari¯es the basic logic. The argument is structured as follows. In section 4.3.1, we provide some basic inequalities which relate together the ex ante probability of an event and the ex ante probability of¯rst order beliefs about that event. In section 4.3.2, we provide an inequality relating the ex ante probability of an event (i.e. P [E]) and the ex ante probability that that event is Kth 
Basic Ex Ante Probability Properties of Belief Operators
The proof will use the following results which relate the ex ante probabilities of event E and the events B pi i (E). The basic insight is that if p i is small and event E has high probability, then there will be a high probability that i p i -believes event E. For purposes of this sub-section, allow P Proof. By the de¯nition of conditional probability, we have
i (E) 6 = ; and thus (by (4.1))
i (E) ] · 1 by de¯nition, we have (by (4.1)):
Taking the union gives:
So (1) follows by setting F = -nB
The Kth order belief inequality
, we would like to provide a upper bound for 1¡P
. Iterated application of lemma 4.7 gives us that
This implies that for any given p 2 (0; 1)
I and K, we can guarantee (uniformly across in-
is large by setting P [E] su±ciently close to 1. But for any p 2 (0; 1)
! K ! 1 as K ! 1, so this inequality will be of no use in bounding
We need a tighter bound. The bound is constructed from the following I £ I matrix R:
::
Lemma 4.9. In any information system © I; -; P; fQ i g i2I ª , for any simple event E,
Intuitively, we want to maximize (over all information systems and all simple events) the value
, subject to the constraint that P [E]¸1 ¡ ", and show that the maximand of this problem is "» ¤ (p; K). For the remainder of this sub-section, we will be considering this maximization problem, which is (implicitly) parameterized by p, K and ".
But how can we formalize the idea of maximizing over information systems? The trick is to observe that we are not interested in the whole structure of the information system, but only in the ex ante probability of certain events. Thus we may, without loss of generality, focus on the probability of events which concern us. But the de¯nitions of those events impose certain linear inequalities on their ex ante probabilities (such as those of the previous sub-section). Our maximization problem \over all information systems" can thus be reduced to a linear programming problem. This is most easily explained by considering special cases. First, let I = 2 and K = 1. Fix any © I; -; P; fQ i g i2I ª and any simple event E = E 1 \ E 2 , where each E i is measurable with respect to Q i . Now B pi i (E) µ E i , so the state space -can be represented by the following box:
where ¼ (i; j) is the probability of the corresponding event (i; j); thus, for example, ¼ (2; 1) = P (B
2 (E)). Notice that although ¼ (:; :) depends on the choice of information system and event E, the relevant relationship between the events E 1 ; E 2 ; B p1
1 (E) and B p2
2 (E) is completely captured by this box representation. Thus our problem reduces to maximizing:
But there are addition restrictions on the ¼ implicit in the above construction. In particular,
Re-arranging gives:
By a symmetric argument:
Suppose (without loss of generality) that p 1¸p2 . Then the maximum possible value of (4.3) subject to (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) is "
One choice of ¼ attaining that maximum is:
Intuitively, we want to distribute the " outside event E in such a way that it can be used to \knock out" the maximum probability when the belief operators are applied once. Given that p 1¸p2 , "
1¡p1 is the most probability that can be knocked out at the next round. Now let K = 2; the relevant division of the state space -becomes:
We seek to maximize
(4.7)
subject to
This programming problem has solution "
1¡p2´´. One choice of ¼ attaining that maximum is:
ntuitively, there is a \critical path" which is the optimal way to use the " to knock out probability in all future rounds; we use this intuition in the following general formulation.
The General Linear Programming Formulation. We now formalize the above approach for arbitrary I and K. Fix © I; -; P; fQ i g i2I ª and, for each i,
i is a simple event. De¯ne inductively fE n 1 ; ::; E n I ; E n g K+1 n=1 as follows:
. Observe that by fact 6, the sets fD n i g K+1 n=0 partition -for each i. In particular, fD n i g K+1 n=0 is a courser partition than Q i . Let n = (n 1 ; ::; n I ) be a typical element of f0; 1; ::; K + 1g I . We shall denote by min (n) the smallest number in fn 1 ; :::; n I g. De¯ne L (n)´\ This notation allows us to characterize every relevant region of the state space by an \address" n 2 f0; ::; K + 1g I ; note that the L(n) are disjoint. With two individuals, we can represent the state space by the following box:
Thus for all n = 1; K + 1 and i 2 I,
(4.14)
Now for all n = 1; K and i 2 I, D n i µ -nE
i (E n ); so we have by lemma 4.8,
Combining (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15), gives, for all n = 1; K and i 2 I, X fn2f0;::;K+1g
I : ni=n and min(n)=ng Observe that
;:::;K+1g
Thus we are interested in the following linear programming problem (P ) 4 : max X fn2f0;::;K+1g
subject to ¼ (n)¸0, (4.16) and (4.17).
Thus the statement of lemma 4.9 has been re-interpreted as a linear programming problem. It remains only to show that the maximand is "» ¤ (p; K). We can guess the form of the solution to P from the I = 2 and K = 1; 2 cases outlined above. The solutions had the property that only certain critical locations had positive probability and this property generalizes. Write c (i; n) for the location where all components are equal to n + 1 except the ith which is n, i.e. c (i; n) = (n + 1; :::; n + 1; n; n + 1; :::; n + 1), and say that n is a critical location if it can be written in this form. The critical path constraint requires:
The critical path intuition suggests that the following problem (P 0 ) has the same value as problem (P ). We will prove this by looking at the dual problems of (P) and (P 0 ).
The Dual Problem. First, the dual problem (D) of (P ) is as follows. Call the constraint corresponding to individual i and n in (4.16) (i; n), and denote by¸(i; n) the shadow price of the constraint. Similarly, denote by » the shadow price of the constraint in (4.17). Consider any n = (n 1 ; :::; n I ) with 0 < min (n) · K. Then ¼ (n) appears in the left hand side of (4.16) if and only if n i = min (n), i.e., ¼ (n) appears in all inequalities (i; n) with n = min (n); ¼ (n) appears in the right hand side of every inequality (i; n) with n i = n > min (n). If k = 0, then ¼ (n) also appears in inequality in (4.17). Thus the dual problem has the following constraints: for each n = (n 1 ; :::; n I ) with min (n) = 0;
4 Note that equation (4.16) must hold as a strict inequality unless both sides of the equation are identically equal to zero. Thus the maximum of the programming problem P will be the supremum of the achievable values of
¢¤
, but may not be attainable.
for n with 0 < min (n) < K;
and for n with min (n) = K; ). Look at the constraints corresponding critical addresses, which will give us the dual form of the critical path:
for c (i; 0), from (4.21), we have:
for c (i; n), n < K, from (4.22), we have:
j; n + 1)¸1 for each i and n; (4.26) and for c (i; n), n = K, from (4.23), we have: Note that for any k, ¤ (i; k)¸¸¤ (i; k + 1) holds for every i: it is straightforward to check that this is true for K ¡ 1, and if it is true for k, then¸¤ (i; k ¡ 1) = 1+
Now for any n with min (n) = 0,
(j; 1)¸1, where the¯rst inequality holds due to the monotonic property of¸¤ shown above. Thus (4.21) is satis¯ed. Similarly, for n with 0 < min (n) = n < K,
(j; n + 1) = 0, where i ¤ can be any i with n i = n. Therefore (4.23) holds. 2
By the duality theorem of linear programming, the value of problem (D) is the same as the value of problem P, completing the proof of lemma 4.9, since » ¤ (p; K) = » ¤ (making the dependence on p and K explicit).
Evaluating » ¤
It remains only to consider what happens to » ¤ (p; K) as K ! 1. First we establish some properties of the matrix R. We will use the following decomposition of R. Write I for the identity matrix. Write D for the diagonal matrix with ith diagonal element p i . Write X for the matrix of 1's. 
Lemma 4.12. I + R + R 2 + ::: is bounded if
Proof.
Write 1 for the column vector on 1's. So
and thus
Proof. First observe that XD = 
These two lemmas imply that:
Lemma 4.12 implies that
. Lemma 4.13 shows that the (i; i)th co-ordinate
and the (i; j)th element is
0 is a column vector with ith coordinate 0
Now proposition 4.3 follows from corollary 4.14 and lemma 4.9.
Robustness and p-Dominance
The Robustness of p-Dominant Equilibria
It is an implication of the work of Monderer and Samet (1989) that any strict Nash equilibrium action pro¯le will be played with high probability in some equilibrium action distribution if there is common p-belief of payo®s, for p close to 1, with high ex ante probability. But what if we have common p-belief of payo®s for some p which is not close to 1? We will extend earlier results of Morris, Rob and Shin (1995) to answer this question.
(This de¯nition extends the de¯nition in Morris, Rob and Shin (1995) to the many player case with asymmetric p; we have also replaced strict inequalities by weak inequalities). Note that a dominant strategies equilibrium is a (0; :::; 0)-dominant equilibrium, and that any pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a 1-dominant equilibrium. It is easy to see if a ¤ is a p-dominant equilibrium and p 0¸p (with the usual vector ordering), then a ¤ is a p 0 -dominant equilibrium. So for any pure strategy equilibrium a ¤ , we are interested in the smallest p for which a ¤ is a p-dominant equilibrium.
The following result uses the core idea of Monderer and Samet's (1989) main result.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose action pro¯le a
¤ is a p-dominant equilibrium of G. Consider any U 2 E (G) and let F be a p-evident event such that F µ -U . Then U has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where
F i by assumption. Consider the modi¯ed incomplete game U 0 where each player's strategy must satisfy ¾ i (a ¤ i j! 0 ) = 1, for all ! 0 2 F i and i 2 I. There exists an equilibrium ¾ of the modi¯ed game. We shall show that ¾ is in fact an equilibrium of U . By construction, for every i, at any ! = 2F i , ¾ i is a best response to ¾ ¡i . Let ! 2 F i . Then by de¯nition, P [FjQ i (!)]¸p i , thus by the construction of ¾, the conditional probability of a ¤ ¡i being played is at least p i , so a ¤ i is a best response against ¾ ¡i . Thus ¾ is also an equilibrium of the original game. 2
Thus a p-dominant equilibrium is robust if we can¯nd a large p-evident F contained in -U for any U which is near G. When can we¯nd such an event? Consider the cyclic matching pennies game (example 3.1). The unique (strict) Nash equilibrium in that example is in fact Observe that C p (-U ) is the largest set which is p-evident and contained in -U (by theorem 4.2). Thus we need to show that there is ± > 0 such that P[C p (-U )]¸1¡± for any "-elaboration U where " is small enough. But this is what proposition 4.3 provides. In particular:
Proof. Write ¹ ¤ for the distribution putting probability 1 on a ¤ . Fix any ± > 0. By proposition 4.3, we can choose " > 0, such that This game has N symmetric pure strategy strict Nash equilibria. Equilibrium a = (a n ; :::; a n ) is p-dominant if p i x n i¸( 1 ¡ p i ) x m i for all m 6 = n and i 2 I, i.e. if p i¸M ax m6 =n
Thus, by proposition 5.3, a = (a n ; :::; a n ) is robust if
Thus there is a sense in which the condition P i2I p i < 1 becomes increasingly severe as the number of players increases.
Non-robustness of p-Dominated Action Pro¯les
Actions which survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated actions are never played in any Nash equilibrium. In this section, we provide an analogous, stronger, condition on a set of actions su±cient to ensure that they are never played in any robust equilibrium. An action subset A ¤ is a subset of A of the form
arg max
That is, A ¤ is p-dominated if for every i, taking an action a i in A ¤ i is not a best response unless he assigns probability at least p i on the others playing some actions in A ¤ ¡i .
Proposition 5.6. If ¹ is robust in G and A ¤ is p-dominated in G with
The proposition is an immediate consequence of the following lemma.
Thus actions in the p-dominated action subset are never played in any equilibrium of the "-elaboration. Proof. The proof is by construction of U . Note that if A ¤ is p-dominated in G with
then there exists q with (1) ; and let ¾ be any equilibrium of U. Write ¹ ¡ A 0 ¡i j! ¢ for the probability i attaches to action set A 0 ¡i given strategy pro¯le ¾ ¡i , i.e. Since the game has multiple Nash equilibria, proposition 3.2 has no implications here. The only pure strategy equilibrium is (X; X), but since this is a p-dominant equilibrium only if p 1¸1 2 13 and p 2¸1 2 13 , proposition 5.3 also has no implications here. But consider the singleton action subset f(X; X)g; f(X; X)g is p-dominated if p 1 < 11 12 and p 2 < 11 12 . Thus by proposition 5.6, X is never played by either player in any robust equilibrium.
Strong p-dominant equilibria and unique robust equilibria
The following stronger concept of p-dominance will help clarify the notions introduced so far.
That is, playing a ¤ i is a unique best response if i believes that the probability of some player j choosing a ¤ j is greater than p i . By continuity, a strong p-dominant equilibrium must be pdominant, since¸h n a ¡i : a j = a ¤ j for some j6 =i oi¸¸( a ¤ i ). The converse does not hold, since typically we will have¸h n a ¡i : a j = a ¤ j for some j6 =i oi >¸(a ¤ i ). The two player case is special, because then
ª . In the two player case, for a generic choice of payo®s, a p-dominant equilibrium must be a strong p-dominant equilibrium. We will use this almost equivalence for the two player case in the next section. However, consider a game with non-generic payo®s where all players are indi®erent between all actions. Every action pro¯le will be a p-dominant equilibrium, and no action pro¯le will be a strong p-dominant equilibrium, for any number of players.
Recall that 1 ¡ p is the row vector with ith component 1 ¡ p i . Now we have:
Lemma 5.10. Action pro¯le a ¤ is a strong p-dominant equilibrium if and only if
So A ¤ is (1 ¡ p)-dominated if and only if,
for all i 2 I and all¸2 ¢ (A ¡i ) with¸³ n a ¡i : a j = a ¤ j for some j6 =i o´> p i , which holds if and only if argmax
This immediately implies:
Corollary 5.11. (Uniqueness). If a ¤ is a strong p-dominant equilibrium with
is the unique robust equilibrium of the game.2
Proof. If a ¤ is strong p-dominant, then a ¤ is p-dominant, so a ¤ is robust by proposition 5.3. But by lemma 5.10 and proposition 5.6, no action pro¯le other than a ¤ is played in any robust equilibrium. In appendix 9.1, we show how our new results on p-belief can be used to address related questions.
Two Player, Two Action Games
Two player games are special because p-dominant equilibria are -generically -strong p-dominant equilibria. We will exploit this in the analysis that follows. We will give a complete characterization of robust equilibria for generic two player, two action games. Recall that, except for some non-generic cases, a two player, two action game has (1) a unique (strict) pure strategy equilibrium; (2) two (strict) pure strategy equilibria; or (3) no pure strategy equilibrium and a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Let us consider each case in turn.
² If there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium, then at least one player has a dominant strategy to play his action in that equilibrium. Say that it is player 1. Then the unique equilibrium is (0; p)-dominant for some p < 1. Thus the unique Nash equilibrium is robust by proposition 5.3.
² If there are two pure strategy equilibria, then (generically) exactly one of them is risk dominant in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . In a two player, two action game, an equilibrium is risk dominant exactly if it is strong (p 1 ; p 2 )-dominant equilibrium for some (p 1 ; p 2 ) with p 1 +p 2 < 1. Now by corollary 5.11, the risk dominant equilibrium is the unique robust equilibrium.
² If a generic two player two action game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, then the (unique) mixed strategy equilibrium is the unique correlated equilibrium. So that unique equilibrium must be robust by proposition 3.2.
Proofs and more detailed discussion of these results is provided in the appendix (section 9.2).
Alternative Formulations of Robustness
In this section we present a framework for understanding the relation between our notion of robustness and the existing \re¯nements" literature. In section 2.2, we constructed the set E (G) of incomplete information games \embedding" G and the subset E (G; ") with P [-U ] = 1¡ ". We were extremely liberal in what we allowed to occur in constructing the perturbed games, and thus our concept of robustness is very strong: we allowed unbounded state spaces, correlated signals and more. One might wish to know whether an equilibrium is robust to a more restrictive class of elaborations, and this is what we study in this section. Consider a mapping with F (G) µ E (G) and write F (G; ") = F (G) \ E (G; ").
De¯nition 7.1. Action distribution ¹ is robust under F if for every ± > 0, there exists ¹ " > 0, such that every U 2 F (G; ")with " · ¹ " has an equilibrium action distribution º with k¹ ¡ ºk · ±.
Thus our notion of \robust to incomplete information" corresponds to \robustness under E." As we put shrink F , \robust under F" becomes a weaker requirement. In the following, we consider various examples of mapping F and their implications.
Bounded Elaborations
Let E F (G) be the set of incomplete information games embedding G where the state space is nite. There would be no change in our results if we replaced E by E F in our de¯nition. Our positive results would go through with identical proofs. The required "-elaborations in the cyclic pennies matching game (example 3.1) could be generated in a¯nite state space: for any given " > 0, choose N > 2 " , let -= f0; 1; :::; Ng, let P be uniform on the state space, let payo®s and partitions be essentially as before. Now for each " > 0, we have a¯nite "-elaboration where the unique strict Nash equilibrium action pro¯le is never played. Note, however, that as " ! 0, a larger and larger state space would be required in the construction of the example.
Consider, then, a set of bounded elaborations. Let E M (G) be the set of incomplete information games embedding G where the state space has at most M elements. Now we have the following result:
Proof. In any information system,
is decreasing in n for n¸1 (by belief operator properties 4 and 5). So in any information system with at most M states,
for all events E. By lemma 4.9,
Now since a ¤ is a strict equilibrium of game G, there exists p < 1 such that a ¤ is p-dominant. Write ¹ ¤ for the probability distribution in ¢ (A) putting probability 1 on a ¤ . Fix any ± > 0. By (7.1), we can choose " > 0 such that
.1 is related to theorem 14.5 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, page 567): they show that, for a¯xed¯nite state space, if
They use this result to make essentially the same point.
Strictness is by no means a necessary condition for even a pure strategy equilibrium to be robust under E M . In particular, by the argument above, any equilibrium which is p-dominant for some p < 1 will be robust under E M . An action pro¯le a ¤ is a p-dominant equilibrium for some p < 1 if and only if for each i 2 I and a i 2
In fact, pure strategy equilibria which are not pdominant for any p < 1 may be robust under E M . But a necessary condition for robustness under E M is strict perfection in the sense of Okada (1981) (an equilibrium is strictly perfect if it is stable in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) as a singleton set). Since strictly perfect equilibria need not exist, equilibria robust under E M need not exist.
Lemma 7.2 shows that our claim that many strict Nash equilibria are not robust relies on unbounded state space elaborations. However, we would argue that if the de¯nition of robustness is altered to consider only state spaces with number of elements bounded by M, it would be reasonable to change the de¯nition of \su±ciently small" ". The logic of our arguments suggests that if we replaced the requirement \for all " > 0" with the requirement \for all " of the order of 1 M ", essentially the same results would continue to hold.
Independent Elaborations
Write E I (G) for the set of games embedding G where
is the set of games embedding G where players have independent types. Now we have:
If a ¤ is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, then a ¤ is robust under E I .
Proof. Again, a ¤ is a p-dominant equilibrium for some p < 1. Now choose " > 0 but su±ciently small such that 1¡ Ã P j2I 1 1¡p j ! "¸p i for all i 2 I. Suppose event E has probability at least 1¡ ". Now by the independence assumption and lemma 4.7, we have that for all i 2 I and ! 2 -:
¤ (E) and so
. Now a similar argument to lemma 7.2 completes the proof. 2
Again, this result is far from tight. Strict perfection is a necessary condition for robustness under E I ; we conjecture that it is su±cient. 
¢ for all events E and i; j; k 2 I with j 6 = k. In other words, independence rules out any interesting questions about higher order beliefs.
Conclusion
The technical contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we have introduced a general notion of the robustness of an equilibrium to a small amount of incomplete information. While closely related to a number of approaches, certain subtle details of our approach ensure that we get very di®erent results. Second, we have demonstrated the existence of games where no robust equilibrium exists.
There is an open set of such games. Third, we have provided two di®erent kinds of positive results. The correlated equilibrium result is straightforward. The common p-belief results utilize new work showing the existence of a surprising amount of structure in arbitrary belief hierarchies with common priors. We believe that this \hidden content" of the common prior is an important area of future work. We certainly do not wish to interpret this work as a new re¯nement. We have shown that some equilibria of some games have the property that they can be played in equilibria of nearby incomplete information games. As economists, we can be relatively con¯dent in those predictions. But in other games, there is no robust equilibrium. This tells us that the equilibrium outcome must be sensitive to changes in the information structure which are small when measured in terms of the ex ante probability of payo® relevant events. The correct way to analyze this sensitivity appears to involve paying attention to \higher order beliefs". The importance of \higher order beliefs" emerges mathematically in our analysis. Rubinstein (1989) and others have argued that \boundedly rational" players might ignore subtleties of higher order beliefs and -in certain circumstances -behave as if there was common knowledge of payo®s even when the underlying information structure does not justify this presumption. This may be true in some circumstances. But we would like to argue against a presumption that bounded rationality should imply a systematic bias in favor of playing \as if" there is common knowledge. A reasonable boundedly rational rule for playing games might be the following. If there really is common knowledge of payo®s -say, because payo®s are publicly announced -play according to a Pareto-e±cient or otherwise focal Nash equilibrium. If there is not common knowledge of payo®s, and there is some action which is an equilibrium action whatever the¯ne details of the situation, play that. This leaves open the question of how a boundedly rational player should play in a game with no robust equilibrium. Consider the cyclic matching pennies game (example 3.1). What is reasonable play in that game when it is not common knowledge, with probability one, that the payo®s are correct? For fully rational players, iterated deletion of dominated strategies alone ensures extreme sensitivity to the information structure. Boundedly rational players might not be able to perform the required iterated deletion. But there is every reason to believe that actual reasonable play -like fully rational play -will involve players trying to outguess others' choices in ways that are highly sensitive to the information structure.
Appendix
A Generalization of Morris, Rob and Shin (1995)
Here we report a generalization of a result of Morris, Rob and Shin (1995) . That result was for two player symmetric games with a¯nite state space. We give a result for many player asymmetric games with an in¯nite state space.
Fix an incomplete information game U = © I; fA i g i2I ; -; P; fQ i g i2I ; fu i g i2I ª . For any given
ª is a complete information game.
Proposition 9.1. Suppose that [1] Players know their own payo®s, so
j is a strictly dominant strategy for some player j at some state !; [4] C 1¡p (E) 2 f;; -g for all simple events E. Then ¾ i (a ¤ i j!) = 1 for all ! 2 -and i 2 I is the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Proof. Suppose ¾ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Write
Thus player i assigns probability 1 to states where some other player j is playing a ¤ j with probability 1, so by [1] and [2] , he has a strict best response to play a ¤ i , so ! = 2 F ¤ i , a contradiction. Thus F ¤ i = ; for all i 2 I and the proposition is proved.
[ii] Suppose that F ¤ 6 = ;. By [3] , we know that F ¤ j 6 = -for some player j and, by construction, we have F ¤ j 2 F j . Thus C 1¡p (F ¤ ) µ F ¤ and in particular C 1¡p (F ¤ ) 6 = -. Thus by [4] , C 1¡p (F ¤ ) = ;. Since F ¤ 6 = ;, we cannot have F ¤ µ C 1¡p (F ¤ ). Thus there exists a player k 2 I and a state
Thus by [1] and [2] ,
2 It is straightforward to show that in fact always playing a ¤ is the unique behavior surviving iterated deletion of dominated strategies. This result will obviously only be of interest if there exist information systems with property [4] of the proposition. In Morris, Rob and Shin (1995) , the belief potential of an information system was the smallest number p such that C (1¡p;1¡p) (E) 2 f;; -g for all simple events E. The belief potential was shown (in a¯nite setting) to be less than 1 2 . The analogous belief potential in our setting would be multidimensional: for any given information system, we would be interested in the set B = n p 2 [0; 1] I : C 1¡p (E) 2 f;; -g for all simple events E o . If some individual's partition has an in¯nite number of elements, it is a consequence of corollary 4.4 (on page 18) that if C 1¡p (E) 2 f;; -g for all simple events E, we must have P i2I p i < 1. Thus proposition 9.1 is vacuous if a ¤ is not strong p-dominant for some p with P i2I p i < 1.
Two Player, Two Action Games
Here we prove more formally the assertions of section 6 and provide some further discussion. We will give a complete characterization of robust equilibria for generic two player, two action games. Thus we consider games of the form
Let us consider each of three generic cases in turn.
Unique Pure Strategy Equilibrium
Suppose (without loss of generality) that (L; L) is the unique (strict) Nash equilibrium. Then at least one player has a dominant strategy to play L (if not, (R; R) would be a Nash equilibrium). Thus (L; L) is either (p; 0)-dominant or (0; p)-dominant for some p < 1. Thus (L; L) is robust by proposition 5.3. Lemma 9.2. If a generic two player, two action game has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, then that equilibrium is robust.
Two Pure Strategy Equilibria
Without loss of generality, assume (L; L) and (R; R) are strict Nash equilibria, so a > e, g > c, b > d and h > f . Harsanyi and Selten (1988) 
For a generic game with two pure strategy equilibria, exactly one will be risk dominant. Lemma 9.3. If a generic two player, two action game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, then the risk dominant equilibrium is robust while the risk dominated equilibrium and the mixed strategy equilibrium are not robust.
is a strong p-dominant equilibrium for some p with p 1 + p 2 < 1 and thus is the unique robust equilibrium, by corollary 5.11.
No Pure Strategy Equilibrium
Lemma 9.4. If a generic two player two action game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, then the (unique) mixed strategy equilibrium is the unique correlated equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose (without loss of generality) that a > e, g > c, d > b and f > h. This game has a unique Nash equilibrium where 1 plays L with probability ¼ 1 = (g¡c) (g¡c)+(a¡e) 2 (0; 1) and 2 plays L with probability ¼ 2 = (f¡h) (f¡h)+(d¡b) 2 (0; 1). Suppose there were a correlated equilibrium where (L; L) was played with probability ¹ 1 , (L; R) with probability ¹ 2 , (R; R) with probability ¹ 3 and (R; L) with probability
Suppose ¹ 1 = 0. Then if ¹ 2 > 0, 1's optimal best response is to play R when he is supposed to play L. Thus ¹ 2 = 0. Analogous arguments show that ¹ 2 = 0 =) ¹ 3 = 0, ¹ 3 = 0 =) ¹ 4 = 0 and ¹ 4 = 0 =) ¹ 1 = 0. Thus we must have ¹ i > 0 for all i = 1; 2; 3; 4. But now optimality requires that
¼1 and
. If any of these inequalities were strict inequalities, then multiplying inequalities together would give 1 > 1. Thus they are all equalities and
This is the original Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 9.5. If a generic two player two action game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, then the (unique) mixed strategy equilibrium is robust.
Proof. Follows immediately from lemma 9.4 and proposition 3.2.
The Non-Generic Case
For non-generic payo®s, a robust equilibrium need not exist. Consider the following example.
No equilibrium is robust to incomplete information. Consider the following "-elaboration: I = f1; 2g; -= f0; 1; 2; :::g; P (!) = " (1 ¡ ") ! ; Q 1 = (f0; 1g; f2; 3g ; :::) and Q 2 = (f0g f1; 2g ; f3; 4g ; :::);
How big is the di®erence between the two notions? To understand the di®erence, it is useful to state proposition 4.3 in terms of sequences. Given a sequence P k of probability distributions, write B p i ;k i , B p;k ¤ and C p;k for the p-belief and common p-belief operators generated by P k . Proposition 9.8. Fix a state space structure © -; fQ i g i2I ª and consider a sequence of probability distributions P k and event E such that
, it is possible to construct a state space structure
sequence of probability distributions P k and event E such that
(1) follows immediately from proposition 4.3; the following example shows (2) for the (hardest) case where
Example 9.9. Fix " k ! 0 and p such that (1) 
The proof is by induction. This is obviously true for n = 0. Suppose it is true for n ¡ 1. Now
. This is true for each i, so
and so C p;k (E) = ;. Proposition 9.8 didn't require that P k converged pointwise to some limit distribution. What happens if we add this requirement? Proposition 9.10. Fix a state space structure © -; fQ i g i2I ª and consider a sequence of probability distributions P k and event E such that P k ! P 1 pointwise and
, a sequence of probability distributions P k and an event E such that P k ! P 1 pointwise and P 1 [E] = 1 but C p;k (E) = ; for all k.
Note that (1) follows from proposition 4.3 except in the critical case where
To see what is so special about P i2I p i = 1, consider again example 9.9. We had P k [E] ! 1 and C p;k (E) = ; for all k. But the sequence P k did not have a well-de¯ned limit. It is not possible to modify the example to have a well de¯ned limit and still have C p;k (E) = ;. We can prove (2) by the following construction.
Example 9.11. Suppose 
P k converges pointwise to P 1 , where
Let E = f(i; k) : i 2 I and k 2 Z + g; now P 1 [E] = 1; E is simple; and B 
, which is less than p i , by (9.1). Now an iterative argument establishes that C p (E) = ;.
Thus to prove proposition 9.10, it remains only to show that (1) holds when (p j ) (1 0 ¡ p 0 ) for all k = 0; 1; ::.2 Lemma 9.13. In any information system, any simple event E satis¯es:
Sketch of Proof:
The proof follows that of lemma 4.10. Now we seek to maximize
Essentially the same critical path argument goes through, and we see that
where ³ ¤ (p; K) = max By lemma 9.12, this is no more than
Lemma 9.14. Suppose P k ! P 1 pointwise. Then for all ± > 0, there exists " > 0 such that for all k su±ciently large, P k hn ! : P k (!) < " oi < ±.
Proof. Fix any ± > 0. Since -is countable, there is a¯nite set -¤ such that
and P 1 (!) > 0 for all ! 2 -¤ . Since -¤ is¯nite, P k converges uniformly to P 1 on -¤ , so P k [-¤ ] > 1 ¡ ±, for all k su±ciently large. Also, we can choose " > 0 such that, for all ! 2 -¤ , P 1 (!) > " and P k (!) > " for all su±ciently large k. But now n ! : P k (!) < " o µ -n-¤ for all su±ciently large k, hence P k hn ! : P k (!) < "
2 Proof of¯nal step of Proposition 9.10: Fix the sequence P k ! P 1 with P 1 [E] = 1. Fix q < 1. By lemma 9.14, there exists " > 0 such that for all k su±ciently large, This small di®erence in the common p-belief result gives a small di®erence between the notions of robustness. Consider the symmetric simple coordination game (example 9.6 on page 42). Neither of the two pure strategy equilibria is robust to incomplete information. But the sequence of "-elaborations used to prove this did not have a well-de¯ned limit probability distribution. In fact, both pure strategy equilibria are robust to elaboration sequences, since P k h C ( 
Extensions and the relation to Carlsson and van Damme (1993a)
In this section, we will speculate rather loosely on the relation on our results to the work of Carlsson and van Damme (1993a) . To do this, we will¯rst speculate how our results would change under certain assumptions.
Uncountable State Spaces
First of all, notice that we have no problem dealing with uncountable state spaces as long as each player has at most a countable number of possible signals. Complications arise with uncountable signals for two reasons.
First, the indeterminacy of conditional probability on zero probability information sets implies that belief operators de¯ned on sets will not be well de¯ned. However, we have shown elsewhere (Kajii and Morris (1994b) ) that if belief operators are de¯ned in a natural measure theoretic way (so that they operate on equivalence classes of events), it is possible to replicate (as probability 1 statements) all the main results from the countable case; and the proof of proposition 4.3, relying on the division of the state space into countable boxes, would presumably go through essentially unchanged.
Second, existence of equilibrium in incomplete information games with correlated uncountable signals remains an open question. Of course, we could still develop characterizations conditional on existence.
Knowing your own Payo®s
We required an "-elaboration to have the property that P [-U ] = 1 ¡ ". This entailed the assumption that not only is there a high probability that payo®s are given by G, but also there is a high probability that everyone knows their own payo®s. A weaker assumption would let -0 U = f! 2 -ju i (a; !) = g i (a) for all a 2 A, i 2 Ig and require an "-elaboration to have the property that P [-0 U ] = 1¡". Clearly, -U µ -0 U , so P [-U ] = 1¡" ) P [-0 U ]¸1¡". With this change, it would be necessary to bound the size of the payo®s in the elaborations: otherwise, larger and larger payo®s outside -0 U could dominate the results. But with the bound on elaboration payo®s, we believe our main results would continue to hold (although the change in de¯nition would presumably change signi¯cantly which non-strict Nash equilibria were robust).
Local Robustness
If we give our results a sequence interpretation and index information systems by the probability distribution P k , then we consider sequences of incomplete information games embedding G with P k ! P 1 (see appendix section 9.3). For any sequence of strategy pro¯les ¾ k , write ¹ k E for the probability distribution over actions contingent on event E being true, given P k and ¾ k . Write C 1;1 (-U ) for the set of states where -U is common 1-belief under probability distribution P 1 . Now say that action distribution ¹ ¤ is locally robust if, for every sequence of elaborations, there is a sequence of equilibria ¾ k , with ¹ k C 1;1 (-U ) ! ¹ ¤ . Our original de¯nition of robustness requires local robustness under the additional restriction that P 1 [-U ] = 1 (which guarantees that C 1;1 (-U ) = -). Presumably our su±cient conditions for robustness would also be su±cient for local robustness.
Relation to Carlsson and van Damme (1993a)
Putting the above results together, we conjecture -leaving aside existence problems -a result of the following form.
Fix a complete information game G = © I; fA i g i2I ; fg i g i2I ª and consider any sequence of incomplete information games embedding G, U k = n I; fA i g i2I ; -; P k ; F, fF i g i2I ; fu i g i2I o , where ³ -; P k ; F´is a measure space and F i is the sub ¾-¯eld representing i's information; write U 1 = © I; fA i g i2I ; -; P 1 ; F, fF i g i2I ; fu i g i2I ª , for the limit of the incomplete information games where P k ! P 1 weakly. Kajii and Morris (1994a) provides a de¯nition for common 1-belief in this setting.
Conjecture 9.15. Suppose that ¹ ¤ is either a p-dominant equilibrium of G for some p with Now we are in a position to compare our result with Carlsson and van Damme (1993a). They show that if an equilibrium of a two player, two action game is risk dominant then, for every sequence of incomplete information games satisfying their \global uncertainty" property, every sequence of equilibria ¾ k has ¹ k C 1;1 (-0 U ) ! ¹ ¤ , where ¹ ¤ puts probability 1 on the risk dominant equilibrium. Thus our result implies the existence of a sequence of equilibria which have the risk dominant outcome played as global uncertainty disappears. Carlsson and van Damme also obtain uniqueness. Intuitively, the reason they obtain uniqueness is because they have restricted attention to a class of critical perturbations (i.e. those satisfying \global uncertainty").
